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I.

INTRODUCTION

For nearly twenty years, Fifth Amendment takings
challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions and permit
conditions have been governed by the dual United States
Supreme Court cases of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission1 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.2 In Nollan, the Court
held that a government could, without paying compensation,
demand an easement as a condition for granting a development
permit the government was entitled to deny as an exaction of
private property, provided that the exaction would substantially
advance the same government interest that would furnish a valid
ground for denial of the permit.3 In Dolan, the Court followed up
with the related requirement that the dedication of private
property must be “‘roughly proportional[]’ . . . both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”4 In its 2013
decision, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, a
deeply divided Court held that the two-part Nollan/Dolan test
applies to a government’s demand for a monetary exaction
imposed on a land-use permit applicant on an ad hoc,
adjudicative basis.5 But the majority in Koontz did not address
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

483 U.S. 825 (1987).
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
483 U.S. at 834, 836–37.
512 U.S. at 391.
133 S. Ct. 2586, 2589 (2013).
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the question of whether legislatively imposed monetary exactions
are also governed by the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan
test.6 As the California Supreme Court recently observed: “The
Koontz decision does not purport to decide whether the
Nollan/Dolan test is applicable to legislatively prescribed
monetary permit conditions that apply to a broad class of
proposed developments.”7
After Koontz, there is significant uncertainty as to whether
the U.S. Supreme Court will accept the distinction between
adjudicative and legislative exactions made by many lower
courts.8 At least one post-Koontz federal decision (currently on
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) applied
Nollan/Dolan to a legislative exaction, but for the wrong
reasons.9 Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas aptly noted in
early 2016: “For at least two decades, however, lower courts have
divided over whether the Nollan/Dolan test applies in cases
where the alleged taking arises from a legislatively imposed

6. In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., the Court made it clear that the Nollan
and Dolan cases were decided in the context of ad hoc, adjudicatively imposed
conditions:
Both Nollan and Dolan involved Fifth Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions—specifically, government demands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her property as a condition of obtaining a development
permit. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379–80 (permit to expand a store and
parking lot conditioned on the dedication of a portion of the relevant
property for a “greenway,” including a bike/pedestrian path); Nollan,
483 U.S. at 828 (permit to build a larger residence on beachfront
property conditioned on dedication of an easement allowing the public to traverse a strip of the property between the owner’s seawall
and the mean high-tide line).
544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005) (citations modified).
7. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 990 n.11 (Cal.
2015).
8. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal.
2002); Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 443-44 (Cal. 1996); Rogers Mach.,
Inc. v. Washington Cty., 45 P.3d 966, 977 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (“With near
uniformity, lower courts applying Dolan to monetary exactions have done so
only when the exaction has been imposed through an adjudicatory process; they
have expressly declined to use Dolan’s heightened scrutiny in testing
development or impact fees imposed on broad classes of property pursuant to
legislatively adopted fee schemes.”).
9. See the discussion of Levin v. City of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072
(N.D. Cal. 2014), infra Part III.F.
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condition rather than an administrative one. That division shows
no signs of abating.”10
Resolving that constitutional uncertainty is of paramount
importance. Justice Thomas recently warned: “Until we decide
this issue, property owners and local governments are left
uncertain about what legal standard governs legislative
ordinances and whether cities can legislatively impose exactions
that would not pass muster if done administratively.”11 Indeed,
Justice Kagan anticipated that uncertainty in her dissent in
Koontz when she stated: “[T]he majority’s refusal ‘to say more’
about the scope of its new rule [of applying Nollan/Dolan to
monetary exactions] now casts a cloud on every decision by every
local government to require a person seeking a permit to pay or
spend money.”12 Due to the widespread concern of that lingering
constitutional uncertainty,13 Justice Thomas believes that there
10. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016)
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of cert.) (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 928–29.
12. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2608
(2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., William R. Devine & Kathryn D. Horning, US Supreme Court
Limits Governmental Power to Impose Conditions on New Development, ALLEN
MATKINS LEGAL ALERT (June 26, 2013), http://www.allenmatkins.com/en/Public
ations/Legal-Alerts/2013/06/26_06_2013-Koontz-Alert.aspx [https://perma.cc/UU
G9-SGQB] (“The decision in Koontz now places in question the continued
applicability of both Ehrlich and San Remo”); Christopher W. Garrett et al.,
Koontz Decision Extends Property Owners’ Constitutional Protections, PUB.
SERVANT (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/koontz-decision
-extends-property-owners-constitutional-protections [https://perma.cc/Z9V7-YLU
E] (“It is not apparent, however, that the Court will accept the distinction drawn
by the California Supreme Court in Ehrlich, and it could apply the Koontz
protections broadly”; the majority opinion in Koontz “leaves open the level of
scrutiny to which legislatively imposed fess [sic] with [sic] now be subject”);
Mitchell B. Menzer & Karen Michail Shah, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District: The United States Supreme Court Expands Fifth
Amendment Takings Protections To Limit Monetary Exactions in Land Use
Matters, PAUL HASTINGS BLOG (July 16, 2013), https://www.paulhastings.com/
publications-items/details/?id=9e09de69-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbde [https://per
ma.cc/QSA3-3SRN] (“The major question left unanswered by Koontz is whether
Nollan/Dolan apply to fees and exactions imposed through legislation of general
application. . . . It remains to be seen whether the Nollan and Dolan restrictions
are eventually extended to legislatively adopted, generally applicable
exactions.”); Jack J. Kubiszyn et al., Supreme Court Rules In Favor of
Landowner Seeking to Develop Property, BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP,
REAL EST. NEWSL. (July 12, 2013), http://www.babc.com/supreme-court-rules-infavor-of-landowner-seeking-to-develop-property-07-12-2013/

5
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are “compelling reasons for resolving this conflict at the earliest
practicable opportunity.”14
This article explains why the Nollan/Dolan test should not
apply to legislatively imposed exactions, provided that such
exactions satisfy two key criteria: (1) the exaction is generallyapplied; and (2) the exaction is applied based on a set legislative
formula without any meaningful administrative discretion in that
application. Legislative exactions that fail to meet those two
criteria should be governed by the Nollan/Dolan standard of
review in the same manner as the ad hoc adjudicative exaction in
Koontz. Furthermore, legislative exactions that satisfy those two
criteria also should not be governed by the factored analysis in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.15 Instead, a
“reasonable relationship” test should be applied to legislative
exactions that satisfy those two criteria.
Part II of this Article discusses the constitutional rationales
that guided the Court in reaching its decision in Koontz regarding
adjudicative monetary exactions. Part III examines how those
rationales, as well as the arguments raised by the Koontz dissent,
demonstrate that Nollan/Dolan should not govern legislative
exactions that are generally-applied and provide no meaningful
discretion to administrators. Part IV explains why the Penn
Central factored analysis also should not govern legislative
exactions that meet those two criteria. Part V demonstrates why
a reasonable relationship test that has been employed in various
forms by state courts should govern legislative exactions that
satisfy those two criteria. Applying that reasonable relationship
test to qualifying legislative exactions lessens judicial
interference with local land use decisions, reinforces the
constitutional rationale in Koontz that development projects
should pay for the external costs they create, and addresses the
concern of property owners that some generally-applied
legislative exactions may “go too far.”

[https://perma.cc/7YDA-TC4V] (Koontz “creates potential confusion as any
legitimate monetary payment required by a governmental entity—such as a
payment for costs relating to sewer, water, traffic or wetlands—now also falls
under the same balancing test.”).
14. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 929 (emphasis added).
15. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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II. KOONTZ EXTENDED THE HEIGHTENED
SCRUTINY OF NOLLAN/DOLAN TO AD HOC,
ADJUDICATIVE MONETARY EXACTIONS, BUT
DID NOT ADDRESS WHETHER NOLLAN/DOLAN
ALSO APPLIES TO LEGISLATIVE EXACTIONS
A. The Heightened Scrutiny in Nollan/Dolan Is Designed
to Protect Land-Use Applicants from a Specific Type
of Regulatory Taking
The Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment provides “nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”16 It does not prohibit the taking of private
property, “but instead places a condition on the exercise of that
power.”17 The Takings Clause is designed “to secure
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
amounting to a taking.”18
The “paradigmatic” taking that requires just compensation is
a “direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private
property.”19 When the government physically takes possession of
an interest in property for some public purpose, “it has a
categorical duty to compensate the former owner, regardless of
whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or
merely a part thereof.”20 That category of “physical takings” cases
“requires courts to apply a clear rule.”21
However, beginning with the 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon,22 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that
“[g]overnment regulation of private property may, in some
instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct
appropriation or ouster—and that such ‘regulatory takings’ may

16. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause is made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co.
v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
17. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987).
18. Id. at 315.
19. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
20. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (internal citation omitted).
21. Id. at 323 (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)).
22. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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be compensable under the Fifth Amendment.”23 A “regulatory
takings” case “‘necessarily entails complex factual assessments of
the purposes and economic effects of government actions.’”24 So
far, the Court has recognized four (4) different theories under
which a government regulation may be challenged under the
Takings Clause. Two of those theories are deemed per se takings,
and two of those theories are not. The two categories of regulatory
action that are deemed per se takings are “where government
requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her
property,”25 and where regulations “completely deprive an owner
of ‘all economically beneficial us[e]’ of her property.”26 For
regulatory actions that do not involve per se takings, the Supreme
Court has historically applied either the factored analysis in Penn
Central or the heightened standard of review in Nollan/Dolan.
Under Penn Central, the Court applied a three-factor
regulatory takings analysis that examines the economic impact of
the regulation, the extent to which it interferes with investment-

23. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537–38 (“In Justice Holmes’ storied but cryptic
formulation, ‘while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.’” (citing Pa. Coal Co. 260 U.S. at
415)).
24. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323 (quoting Yee, 503 U.S. at 523). In TahoeSierra, the Court explained the rationale as to why judicial review is different in
physical takings cases and regulatory takings cases:
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for
public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving
physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a
claim that there has been a “regulatory taking,” and vice versa. . . .
Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some tangential way—often in completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings would transform
government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford.
By contrast, physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront to individual property
rights.
Id. at 323–24.
25. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
26. Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992))
(emphasis in original).
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backed expectations, and the character of the governmental
action.27
Under the two-part inquiry of Nollan/Dolan, “a unit of
government may not condition the approval of a land-use permit
on the owner’s relinquishment of a portion of his property unless
there is a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the
government’s demand and the effects of the proposed land use.”28
In Koontz, the majority of the Justices held that this two-part test
applies when the government demands a monetary exaction in
order to obtain an adjudicative land use permit.29
B. The Majority in Koontz Applied Nollan/Dolan to Ad
Hoc, Adjudicative Monetary Exactions
The petitioner in Koontz (and his father before him) sought to
develop a portion of his 14.9-acre property, the southern portion
of which included wetlands.30 His development plans called for
the development of the 3.7-acre northern section of his property.31
Under Florida state law, a landowner wishing to undertake
construction on that particular type of property had to obtain a
management and storage of surface water permit (which could
27. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. (Penn Central) v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477
U.S. 340, 349 (1986); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,
224–25 (1986); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). In
Lingle, the Court explained the Penn Central analysis as follows:
The Court in Penn Central acknowledged that it had hitherto been
“unable to develop any ‘set formula’” for evaluating regulatory takings claims, but identified “several factors that have particular significance.” Primary among those factors are “[t]he economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations.” In addition, the “character of the governmental action”-for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through “some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good” may be relevant in discerning whether a taking
has occurred.
544 U.S. at 538–39 (internal citations omitted).
28. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591
(2013).
29. Id. at 2603.
30. Id. at 2591-92.
31. Id. at 2592.

9
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impose “such reasonable conditions” on the permit as are
“necessary to assure” that construction will “not be harmful to the
water resources of the district”) and a wetlands resource
management permit.32 Petitioner sought such a permit from the
St. Johns River Water Management District (“District”).33 To
mitigate the environmental effects of his proposal, petitioner
offered to foreclose any possible future development of the
approximately 11-acre southern section of his land by deeding to
the District a conservation easement on that portion of his
property.34 The District considered the proposed easement to be
inadequate, and informed petitioner that the District would
approve construction only if he agreed to one of two concessions:
(a) Petitioner reduce the size of his development to 1 acre and
deed a conservation easement to the District on the remaining
13.9 acres; or (b) proceed with the development on the terms
proposed by petitioner and hire contractors to make
improvements to District-owned land several miles away.35 The
District also said that it “would also favorably consider”
alternatives to its suggested offsite mitigation projects if
petitioner proposed something “equivalent.”36
Petitioner filed suit in a Florida state court under a state law
that provides money damages for agency action that are “an
unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a
taking without just compensation.”37 The Florida trial court
found that the District’s demands failed to comply with
Nollan/Dolan.38 The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed.39
The Florida Supreme Court reversed on two grounds: (1) unlike
the conditional approvals in Nollan or Dolan, the District here
denied Petitioner’s permit application; and (2) a monetary
exaction cannot give rise to a takings claim under

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
Id.
Id. at 2592-93.
Id. at 2593.
Id.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2016)).
Id.
Id.
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Nollan/Dolan.40 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that
the Florida Supreme Court erred on both grounds.41
First, the Court unanimously agreed the Nollan/Dolan
standard may apply to the government’s denial of a permit.
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito stated that “the
government’s demand for property from a land-use permit
applicant must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan
even when the government denies the permit . . . .”42 The dissent
agreed: “The Nollan-Dolan standard applies not only when the
government approves a development permit conditioned on the
owner’s conveyance of a property interest (i.e., imposes a
condition subsequent), but also when the government denies a
permit until the owner meets the condition (i.e., imposes a
condition precedent).”43
Second, by a 5-4 margin, the Court held that “so-called
‘monetary exactions’ must satisfy the nexus and rough
proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.”44 The
majority concluded that a government’s “demand for property”
from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the requirements
of Nollan and Dolan, “even when its demand is for money.”45
Thus, the majority in Koontz applied the heightened scrutiny of
Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions in an ad hoc,
individualized context. The analysis below examines the
constitutional rationales adopted by the majority in reaching that
conclusion.
C. The Majority in Koontz Focused on Extortionate
Governmental Demands and Monetary Targeting of
Specific Properties
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito explained that the
constitutional basis for the heightened scrutiny in Nollan/Dolan
is the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine. The Court explained
that, because “the government may not deny a benefit to a person
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593-94.
Id. at 2603.
Id.
Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2599.
Id. at 2603.

11

248

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

because
he
exercises
a
constitutional
right,”46
the
unconstitutional
conditions
doctrine
“vindicates
the
Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the government
from coercing people into giving them up.”47 The premise of any
unconstitutional conditions claim “is that the government could
not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim
to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.”48
Justice Alito noted that Nollan and Dolan involve “‘a special
application’ of [the unconstitutional conditions] doctrine that
protects the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for
property the government takes when owners apply for land-use
permits.”49
The majority opinion discussed the “two realities of the
permitting process” that warrant the “special application” of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine under Nollan/Dolan.50 The
first reality is “that land-use permit applicants are especially
vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine prohibits because the government often has
broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth far more than
property it would like to take.”51 Justice Alito explains the
“extortionate” nature of that relationship between permit
applicants and local governments:
By conditioning a building permit on the owner’s deeding over a
public right-of-way, for example, the government can pressure an
owner into voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth
Amendment would otherwise require just compensation. So long
as the building permit is more valuable than any just compensation the owner could hope to receive for the right-of-way, the
owner is likely to accede to the government’s demand, no matter
how unreasonable. Extortionate demands of this sort frustrate

46. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594 (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2598.
49. Id. at 2594 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547
(2005)).
50. Id.
51. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/1

12

2017]

LET’S BE REASONABLE

249

the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.52

Justice Alito continues:
Extortionate demands for property in the land-use permitting
context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take
property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to
have property taken without just compensation. As in other unconstitutional conditions cases in which someone refuses to cede
a constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally
cognizable injury.53

Thus, the potential for extortionate demands by the
government warrants application of the heightened scrutiny of
Nollan/Dolan in the land use context.54
The second reality of the permitting process, according to the
majority, is that “many proposed land uses threaten to impose
costs on the public that dedications of property can offset.”55
Justice Alito recognized that requiring landowners to internalize
the negative externalities of their conduct “is a hallmark of
responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained such
regulations against constitutional attack.”56
The heightened scrutiny in Nollan/Dolan accommodates
those two realities “by allowing the government to condition
approval of a permit on the dedication of property to the public so
long as there is a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the
property that the government demands and the social costs of the

52. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95 (internal citations omitted).
53. Id. at 2596 (emphasis added).
54. Because of that threat of extortionate demands in the adjudicative
exactions context, the majority in Koontz explained that heightened scrutiny
was needed, despite the potential applicability of other constitutional doctrines:
the court has “repeatedly rejected the dissent’s contention that other
constitutional doctrines leave no room for the nexus and rough proportionality
requirements of Nollan and Dolan. Mindful of the special vulnerability of land
use permit applicants to extortionate demands for money, we do so again today.”
Id. at 2602–03.
55. Id. at 2595.
56. Id.
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applicant’s proposal.”57 Thus, the Court’s precedents combine
those two realities by allowing the government “to insist that
applicants bear the full costs of their proposals while still
forbidding the government from engaging in ‘out-and-out . . .
extortion’ that would thwart the Fifth Amendment right to just
compensation.58 Those rationales must be addressed in any
analysis of judicial scrutiny of legislative exactions.
Furthermore, the majority in Koontz essentially made four
arguments in support of applying Nollan/Dolan to the ad hoc
monetary exactions in that case. First, Justice Alito argued that
it would be “very easy” for land-use permitting officials to evade
the limitations of Nollan/Dolan if monetary exactions were not
brought under that heightened scrutiny.59 For example,
“[b]ecause the government need only provide a permit applicant
with one alternative that satisfies the nexus and rough
proportionality standards, a permitting authority wishing to
exact an easement could simply give the owner a choice of either
surrendering an easement or making a payment equal to the
easement’s value.”60 Those “in lieu of” fees are “functionally
equivalent to other types of land use exactions.”61
Second, the Koontz majority distinguished the monetary
exaction imposed on the particular real property in that case from
general taxes that were addressed in Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel.62 In Eastern Enterprises, the United States retroactively
imposed on a former mining company an obligation to pay for the
medical benefits of retired miners and their families.63 A fourJustice plurality in Eastern Enterprises concluded that the
statute’s imposition of retroactive financial liability was so
arbitrary that it violated the Takings Clause.64 However, Justice
Kennedy joined four other Justices in dissent in Eastern
Enterprises in arguing that the Takings Clause does not apply to
57. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
58. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at
837).
59. Id. at 2599.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)).
63. E. Enters, 524 U.S. at 513-14, 517.
64. Id. at 538.
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government-imposed financial obligations that “d[o] not operate
upon or alter an identified property interest.”65 The majority in
Koontz distinguishes Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Eastern
Enterprises by focusing on the property-specific nature of the
exaction at issue in Koontz. Justice Alito wrote that, unlike
Eastern Enterprises, the demand for money in Koontz “‘operate[d]
upon . . . an identified property interest’ by directing the owner of
a particular piece of property to make a monetary payment,” and
“burdened petitioner’s ownership of a specific parcel of land.”66
The Koontz case therefore bore a resemblance to cases holding
that the government must pay just compensation “when it takes a
lien–a right to receive money that is secured by a particular piece
of property.”67 Justice Alito explained:
The fulcrum this case turns on is the direct link between the government’s demand and a specific parcel of real property. Because
of that direct link, this case implicates the central concern of Nollan and Dolan: the risk that the government may use its substantial power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough
proportionality to the effects of the proposed new use of the specific property at issue, thereby diminishing without justification
the value of the property.68

Justice Alito added:
[The petitioner] does not ask us to hold that the government can
commit a regulatory taking by directing someone to spend money.
As a result, we need not apply Penn Central’s “essentially ad hoc,
factual inquir[y],” at all, much less extend that “already difficult
and uncertain rule” to the “vast category of cases” in which someone believes that a regulation is too costly. Eastern Enterprises,
524 U. S. at 542, (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Instead, petitioner’s
claim rests on the more limited proposition that when the government commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property interest such as a bank account or par-

65. E. Enters, 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., opinion concurring in judgment
and dissenting in part).
66. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2600 (emphasis added).
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cel of real property, a “per se [takings] approach” is the proper
mode of analysis under the Court’s precedent.69

Thus, the majority in Koontz emphasized the individualized,
property-specific nature of the exaction that falls within
Nollan/Dolan.
Third, Justice Alito rejected the argument that, if monetary
exactions are made subject to scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan,
then there will be no principled way of distinguishing
impermissible land-use exactions from property taxes. He wrote
that “[i]t is beyond dispute that ‘[t]axes and user fees . . . are not
“takings,”‘“ and therefore the Court’s holding in Koontz “does not
affect the ability of governments to impose property taxes, user
fees, and similar laws and regulations that may impose financial
burdens on property owners.”70 Also, he explained, the Court has
had “little trouble distinguishing” between the power of taxation
and the power of eminent domain.71
D. The Dissent in Koontz Decried Judicial Intrusion into
Local Land Use Decisions
Writing for the dissent, Justice Kagan refused to apply
Nollan/Dolan to monetary exactions in the land use context. She
explained that “[c]laims that government regulations violate the
Takings Clause by unduly restricting the use of property are
generally ‘governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, (1978).’”72 While the
Penn Central test “balances the government’s manifest need to
pass laws and regulations ‘adversely affect[ing] . . . economic
values,’ with our longstanding recognition that some regulation
‘goes too far,’” the Nollan and Dolan decisions are different
because “[t]hey provide an independent layer of protection in ‘the
special context of land-use exactions.’”73 She added: “Nollan and
Dolan thus serve not to address excessive regulatory burdens on
69. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600 (alteration in original) (emphasis added at
“specific, identifiable property interest”) (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 2600-01 (citing Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538
U.S. 216, 243 n.2 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2602.
72. Id. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
73. Id. (citations omitted).
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land use (the function of Penn Central), but instead to stop the
government from imposing an ‘unconstitutional condition’—a
requirement that a person give up his constitutional right to
receive just compensation ‘in exchange for a discretionary benefit’
8having ‘little or no relationship’ to the property taken.”74 The
dissent concluded that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
cannot apply to challenges to monetary exactions at all in the
land use context.75 Justice Kagan explained: “[A] court can use
the Penn Central framework, the Due Process Clause, and (in
many places) state law to protect against monetary demands,
whether or not imposed to evade Nollan and Dolan, that simply
“go[] too far.”76
The dissent also highlighted the ambiguity regarding the
scope of the majority’s opinion. Specifically, Justice Kagan was
concerned that, by extending Nollan and Dolan’s heightened
scrutiny to a simple payment demand, “the majority threatens
the heartland of local land-use regulation and service delivery, at
a bare minimum depriving state and local governments of
‘necessary predictability.’”77 She lamented that, “[b]y applying
Nollan and Dolan to permit conditions requiring monetary
payments–with no express limitation except as to taxes–the
majority extends the Takings Clause, with its notoriously
‘difficult’ and ‘perplexing’ standards, into the very heart of local
land-use regulation and service delivery.”78 Justice Kagan was
concerned that “the flexibility of state and local governments to
take the most routine actions to enhance their communities will
diminish accordingly.”79 The dissent questioned the majority’s
position that the decision will have only limited impact on
localities’ land-use authority, because “the majority’s refusal ‘to
say more’ about the scope of its new rule now casts a cloud on

74. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 2606-07, -09 n.3 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2609 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)
77. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,
542 (1998) (Kennedy, J., opinion concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part)).
78. Id. at 2607 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
79. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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every decision by every local government to require a person
seeking a permit to pay or spend money.”80
E. Koontz Left Open the Question of Whether
Nollan/Dolan Applies to Legislative Exactions
The majority in Koontz did not address the issue of whether
legislatively applied exactions are also governed by
Nollan/Dolan. Professor John Echeverria notes: “The majority
opinion in Koontz is pointedly silent as to whether the ruling
applies only to ad hoc fees or applies to fees imposed through
general rules as well.”81 Professor Echeverria aptly predicts:
“With respect to monetary fees, one issue that will preoccupy the
lower courts in the years ahead is whether the Koontz ruling that
monetary fees are subject to Nollan/Dolan applies to fees
calculated and imposed, not in ad hoc proceedings, but through
general legislation.”82 As discussed above, that ambiguity has led
Justice Thomas to recently point out the “compelling reasons for
resolving this conflict at the earliest practicable opportunity.”83
For the reasons discussed below, this author recommends
that the Court should follow Justice Kagan’s suggestion in Koontz
that the Court “approve the rule, adopted in several States, that
Nollan and Dolan apply only to permitting fees that are imposed
ad hoc, and not to fees that are generally applicable.”84

80. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
81. John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 54-55 (2014).
82. Id. at 54.
83. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 929 (2016).
84. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing as an example
Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996)).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/1

18

2017]

LET’S BE REASONABLE

255

III. NOLLAN/DOLAN GENERALLY SHOULD NOT
APPLY TO LEGISLATIVE EXACTIONS IN LIGHT
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALES
DISCUSSED IN KOONTZ
A. The Language in Dolan, Itself, Draws a Distinction
Between Adjudicative and Legislative Exactions
The Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether
Nollan/Dolan test applies to legislative exactions. Citing his
dissent to a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 1995
case of Parking Association of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,85
Justice Thomas came the closest to addressing that issue when he
recently opined that he “continue[s] to doubt that ‘the existence of
a taking should turn on the type of governmental entity
responsible for the taking.’”86 In Parking Association, Justice
Thomas earlier explained:
It is hardly surprising that some courts have applied [Dolan’s]
rough proportionality test even when considering a legislative
enactment. It is not clear why the existence of a taking should
turn on the type of governmental entity responsible for the taking. A city council can take property just as well as a planning
commission can. Moreover, the general applicability of the ordinance should not be relevant in a takings analysis. . . . The distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized
administrative takings appears to be a distinction without a constitutional difference.87

Since Justice Thomas articulated those comments in Parking
Association,
however,
courts
have
recognized
several

85. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta , 515 U.S. 1116, 1118 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
86. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n,136 S. Ct. at 928 (quoting Parking Ass’n of Ga.,
515 U.S. at 1116).
87. Parking Ass’n of Ga., 515 U.S. at 1117-18; see Luke A. Wake & Jarod
M. Bona, Legislative Exactions After Koontz v. St. John River Management
District, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 539, 571 (2015) (“If the sine qua non of an
unconstitutional conditions violation is [the] government’s imposed choice between
giving up a constitutional right to attain something wanted and foregoing the
wanted item, it does not matter whether the choice arrives by legislative
enactment or through the discretion of permitting authorities.”).
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constitutional grounds to distinguish between legislative and
adjudicative exactions in the application of Nollan/Dolan.
In her dissent in Koontz, Justice Kagan found such a
distinction within the language in Dolan. She explained that
“Dolan itself suggested that limitation by underscoring that there
‘the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s
application for a building permit on an individual parcel,’ instead
of imposing an ‘essentially legislative determination[ ] classifying
entire areas of the city.’”88 Other courts have found that
comparative language in Dolan to be constitutionally significant.
For example, in Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation District, the
Colorado Supreme Court noted that the language in Dolan
“distinguished typical land use regulations from the type of
pointed exaction demanded in Dolan,”89 and reinforced the fact
that Nollan and Dolan “concerned discretionary adjudicative
determinations specific to one landowner and one parcel of land,
and involved a demand for the dedication of a portion of the land
for public use.”90 The Arizona Supreme Court similarly
recognized in Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v.
City of Scottsdale91 that “the Chief Justice [in Dolan] was careful
to point out that the case involved a city’s adjudicative decision to
impose a condition tailored to the particular circumstances of an
individual case,” whereas the development fee at issue in the
Arizona case “involves a generally applicable legislative decision
by the city.”92
88. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)).
89. 19 P.3d 687, 696 (2001).
90. Id. at 695. In Lingle, the U.S. Supreme Court similarly stated: “Both
Nollan and Dolan involved Fifth Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative
land-use exactions”; and “[t]he Court further refined this requirement in Dolan,
holding that an adjudicative exaction requiring dedication of private property
must also be ‘“roughly proportional” . . . both in nature and extent to the impact
of the proposed development.’” 544 U.S. 528, 546-47 (2005) (emphasis added).
91. 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997).
92. Id. at 1000 (emphasis in original); see also Se. Cass Water Res. Dist. v.
Burlington N. R.R. Co., 527 N.W.2d 884, 896 (N.W. 1995) (whereas Dolan made
a distinction between the city’s “adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s
application for a building permit on an individual parcel,” and other decisions
that involved “essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of
the city,” a North Dakota state statute that required railroads to modify bridges
and culverts at their own expense did not constitute a compensable taking
because the railroad’s duty arose “not from a municipal ‘adjudicative decision to
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Like the dissent in Koontz and such other lower courts, the
U.S. Supreme Court will likely recognize that the language of
Dolan, itself, draws a constitutionally significant difference
between legislative and adjudicative exactions.
B. The “Extortionate Demands” Prong of the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Demonstrates
that Nollan/Dolan Should Not Apply to Legislative
Exactions that Contain No Meaningful Administrative
Discretion
As it did in Koontz, the Court will likely begin its analysis of
the applicability of Nollan/Dolan to legislative exactions by
considering the “two realities of the permitting process” that
underlie the application of the unconstitutional conditions. The
first “reality” of the permitting process is the potential for an
“extortionate” relationship between land use applicants and
permitting agencies, and the “special vulnerability of land use
permit applicants to extortionate demands for money.”93
However, that concern is greatly diminished in the context of
legislative exactions because such exactions are less prone to
condition,’ but rather from an express and general legislated duty under a
constitutional reservation of police power over a corporation”); Spinell Homes,
Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 78 P.3d 692, 702 (Alaska 2003) (“A
Nollan/Dolan taking may arise when the government makes ‘an adjudicative
decision to condition [the landowner’s] application for a building permit on an
individual parcel,’ as opposed to a legislative determination of general
application. . . . But [plaintiff] Spinell has not demonstrated that the
municipality specially required Spinell to dedicate any property for public
easements or to construct new street. The municipality simply required that
predetermined municipal requirements be satisfied before it would issue
permits or certificates. These requirements were city-wide conditions . . . There
is no indication Spinell was required to do anything other developers were not
required to do to satisfy the plat notes for their subdivisions” (quoting Dolan,
512 U.S. at 385)); Waters Landing Ltd. P’ship v. Montgomery Cty., 650 A.2d
712, 724 (1994) (The U.S. Supreme Court in Dolan, “in reaching its holding,
specifically relied on two distinguishing characteristics that are absent in the
instant case. First, the Court mentioned that instead of making ‘legislative
determinations classifying entire areas of the city,’ the City of Tigard ‘made an
adjudicative decision to condition [the landowner’s] application for a building
permit on an individual parcel.’ . . . In contrast, Montgomery County imposed
the development impact tax by legislative enactment, not by adjudication . . ..”
(Citation omitted.))
93. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603
(2013).
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“leveraging” (i.e., extortionate demands). That is the conclusion of
a number of lower courts that have considered that issue.
The California Supreme Court in Erlich v. Culver City94
applied the Nollan/Dolan test to ad-hoc, adjudicative exactions,
but not to exactions that are imposed legislatively.95 In Ehrlich, a
developer requested that a city amend its general plan, change
the zoning of his property and amend the specific plan in order to
allow him to build a 39-unit residential condominium complex on
his property, which property had previously been used as a
private tennis club and recreational facility.96 Eventually, the city
council approved the application “conditioned upon the payment
of certain monetary conditions”97 which included fees to be used
for partial replacement of the lost recreational facilities
occasioned by the specific plan amendment; and a fee under the
city’s “art in public places” program.98 The developer filed a
petition for writ of mandate to set aside both fees as
unconstitutional takings.99
The California Supreme Court decided the case not only by
reference to the constitutional takings clause, but also under
California’s Mitigation Fee Act (“Act”).100 Section 66001 of the Act
sets forth a two-part standard for assessing the reasonableness of
a monetary exaction by local governments. Subdivision (b) of
section 66001applies to “adjudicatory, case-by-case actions”
involving application of a fee ordinance to a particular
development project.101 For such adjudicatory ad hoc fees,
subdivision (b), provides:
In any action imposing a fee as a condition of approval of a development project by a local agency, the local agency shall deter-

94. The California Supreme Court’s decision in Ehrlich followed a remand
from the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider that case in light of Dolan. Ehrlich v.
City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994).
95. Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996) (Arabian, J.,
plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 434 (Arabian, J., plurality opinion).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 435 (Arabian, J., plurality opinion).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 433 (Arabian, J., plurality opinion).
101. Garrick Dev. Co. v. Hayward Unified Sch. Dist., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897,
907 (1992).
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mine how there is a reasonable relationship between the amount
of the fee and the cost of the public facility or portion of the public
facility attributable to the development on which the fee is imposed.102

The Ehrlich court construed the “reasonable relationship”
language in subdivision (b) that applies to ad hoc determinations
“as imposing a requirement consistent with the Nollan/Dolan
standard, we serve the legislative purpose of protecting
developers from disproportionate and excessive fees.”103 The
Ehrlich court therefore viewed the ad hoc land use permit context
in the same way as the majority of the Justices on the U.S.
Supreme Court recently did in Koontz. However, the Ehrlich
court took a very different approach to legislatively-imposed
monetary exactions. Subdivision (a) of section 66001 applies to
the adoption of legislative exactions,104 and requires that a local
agency to determine “how there is a reasonable relationship”

102. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 66001(b) (West 2007) (emphasis added).
103. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 438 (Arabian, J., plurality opinion). The Ehrlich
court explained the regulatory “leveraging” of permit power in the context of
adjudicatory land use permits:
In our view, the intermediate standard of judicial scrutiny formulated by the high court in Nollan and Dolan is intended to address just
such indicators in land use ‘bargains’ between property owners and
regulatory bodies—those in which the local government conditions
permit approval for a given use on the owner’s surrender of benefits
which purportedly offset the impact of the proposed development. It
is in this paradigmatic permit context—where the individual property owner-developer seeks to negotiate approval of a planned development—that the combined Nollan and Dolan test quintessentially
applies.
Id. The court added:
It is the imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases, authorized by a permit scheme which by its nature allows for both the
discretionary deployment of the police power and an enhanced potential for its abuse, that constitutes the sine qua non for application
of the intermediate standard of scrutiny formulated by the court in
Nollan and Dolan.
Id. at 439 (Arabian, J., plurality opinion). In his concurring opinion in Ehrlich,
Justice Mosk similarly explained: “[W]hen a municipality singles out a property
developer for a development fee not imposed on others, a somewhat heightened
scrutiny of that fee is required to ensure that the developer is not being subject
to arbitrary treatment for extortionate motives.” Id. at 460 (Mosk, J., concurring
opinion).
104. Garrick, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 907.
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between the proposed use of a given exaction and both “the type
of development project” and “the need for the public facility and
the type of development project on which the fee is imposed.”105
In a concurring opinion in Ehrlich, Justice Mosk explained that
“general governmental fees” are “judged under a standard of
scrutiny closer to the rational basis review of the equal protection
clause than the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan.”106 He
added, “Courts will, for federal constitutional purposes, defer to
the legislative capacity of the states and their subdivisions to
calculate and charge fees designated for legitimate government
objectives, unless the fees are plainly arbitrary or
confiscatory.”107
Other state supreme courts have adopted Ehrlich’s approach
to legislative exactions. For example, the Supreme Court for the
State of Washington repeated the observation in Ehrlich that “it
is not at all clear that the rationale (and the heightened standard
of scrutiny) of Nollan and Dolan applies to cases in which the
exaction takes the form of a generally applicable development fee
or assessment – cases in which the courts have deferred to
legislative and political processes to formulate ‘public program[s]
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.’”108 The Colorado Supreme Court similarly
explained:
One critical difference between a legislatively based fee and a
specific, discretionary adjudicative determination is that the risk
of leveraging or extortion on the part of the government is virtually nonexistent in a fee system. When a governmental entity assesses a generally applicable, legislatively based development fee,
all similarly situated landowners are subject to the same fee
schedule, and a specific landowner cannot be singled out for extraordinary concessions as a condition of development.109

105. Erlich, 911 P.2d at 436-37 (Arabian, J., plurality opinion) (quoting
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 66001(a)(3)-(4)).
106. Id. at 457 (Mosk, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 458.
108. City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 808 n.4 (Wash. 2006)
(alteration in original) (quoting Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 447).
109. Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 696 (Colo. 2001).
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Likewise, the Arizona Supreme Court observed that “the
Dolan analysis applied to cases of regulatory leveraging that
occur when the landowner must bargain for approval of a
particular use of its land,” but the risk of that sort of leveraging
“does not exist when the exaction is embodied in a generally
applicable legislative decision.”110
The California Supreme Court revisited the distinction
drawn in Ehrlich between generally applicable development fees
and “special, discretionary permit conditions” in San Remo Hotel
v. City and County of San Francisco.111 In that case, plaintiff
owners of a hotel sought approval from the City and County of
San Francisco to rent all rooms in the hotel to tourists or other
daily renters, rather than to longer term residents. The city
granted that approval subject to plaintiffs’ compliance with the
City’s Residential Hotel Unit Conversion and Demolition
Ordinance (“HCO”), which required replacement of the
residential units the City claimed would be lost by the conversion,
or paying an in-lieu fee into a governmental fund for the
construction of low and moderate-income housing.112 In response
to plaintiffs’ takings challenge to the conversion fee, the
California Supreme Court refused to apply Nollan/Dolan and
instead applied the deferential test for legislatively imposed fees
under the Mitigation Fee Act that was discussed in Ehrlich.113
The court explained:
While legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of improper leveraging, such generally applicable legislation is subject
to the ordinary restraints of the democratic political process. A
city council that charged extortionate fees for all property development, unjustifiable by mitigation needs, would likely face
widespread and well-financed opposition at the next election. Ad
hoc individual monetary exactions deserve special judicial scrutiny mainly because, affecting fewer citizens and evading system-

110. Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993,
1000 (Ariz. 1997).
111. San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 103 (Cal. 2002);
see also Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass’n. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 77
Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (Nollan/Dolan test applies to “ad hoc
mitigation fees”).
112. San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 91.
113. Id. at 105.
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atic assessment, they are more likely to escape such political controls.114

Similar to that rationale in San Remo Hotel, some
commentators suggest that a key constitutional concern in the ad
hoc context is the lack of transparency in the imposition of
permitting exactions, which is generally not a concern in the
legislative context.115
Other state supreme courts have adopted the “political
process” rationale behind the legislative/adjudicative distinction
described in Ehrlich and San Remo Hotel. For example, the
Oregon Supreme Court held in Rogers Machinery, Inc. v.
Washington County116 that a traffic impact fee assessed against
property developers under a county ordinance to fund
improvements to city streets was not governed by the
Nollan/Dolan test.117 In support of that conclusion, the Oregon
court stated that, “as Ehrlich and San Remo Hotel accurately
observe, the two-pronged heightened scrutiny that the Court
adopted in Dolan was animated by the Court’s particular concern
with the sort of governmental leveraging that can arise in caseby-case adjudicatory imposition of development conditions.”118
The Oregon court adopted the reasoning of San Remo Hotel that
114. Id.; see McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1282 (2009) (“As noted by San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d
at 105, any concerns of improper legislative development fees are better kept in
check by ‘ordinary restraints of the democratic political process.’”).
115. See Echeverria, supra note 81, at 54 (“[L]egislative enactments are
generally the product of more carefully considered, transparent decision making
by senior government officers than permitting decisions arrived at in ad hoc
administrative proceedings. Nollan and Dolan are arguably rooted in the
Court’s particular suspicions about the negotiations that occur in the court of ad
hoc proceedings. Thus a majority of the Court may be willing not to extend
Nollan and Dolan to legislative fees.”); see also Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the
Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. LAW 1, 24 (2014) (citing Town of Leesburgh
v. Giordano, 701 S.E.2d 783 (2010)) (“Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Koontz
does not reflect disdain for development exactions, but may express irritation
with the lack of transparency in the process by which developers are led to
accede to informal demands for possibly unreasonable exactions. In the case of
incentive fees or applicant-created infrastructure expenses of a routine nature,
transparency could be furthered by legislatively-enacted fee schedules. Those
are upheld unless clearly unreasonable.”).
116. 45 P.3d 966 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
117. Id. at 981-82.
118. Id. at 982.
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“‘[w]hile legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of
improper leveraging, such generally applicable legislation is
subject to the ordinary restraints of the democratic political
process.’”119
A few courts, such as the Texas Supreme Court, appear to be
more concerned about the danger of improper leveraging in the
legislative context, even with the inherent transparency of the
political process.120 However, that theoretical danger is present
with any generally-applicable tax or user fee, including property
taxes, which Koontz explicitly held is not governed by
Nollan/Dolan.121 Moreover, the concern over improper leveraging
in the legislative context is significantly reduced where, as in San
Remo Hotel (1) the legislation that includes the exaction is
“generally applicable legislation in that it applies, without
discretion or discrimination, to every residential hotel in the city”;
and (2) “no meaningful government discretion enters into either
the imposition or the calculation of the in lieu fee.”122 Also,
“extortionate demands” in the legislative context would likely be
eliminated by the application of a “reasonable relationship” test

119. Id. at 982 (quoting San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 105-06).
120. See Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d
620, 641 (Tex. 2004) (“While we recognize that an ad hoc decision is more likely
to constitute a taking than general legislation, we think it entirely possible that
the government could ‘gang up’ on particular groups to force extractions that a
majority of constituents would not only tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens
they would otherwise bear were shifted to others.”); see also Wake & Bona,
supra note 74, at 571 n.206. (“One conceived basis for this distinction [between
legislative and adjudicative exactions] is that legislative bodies are—
hypothetically—less likely to treat the permitting process as an opportunity to
force valuable concessions from landowners. The assumption is that legislative
bodies are more accountable to the people; however, this discounts the fact that
legislative bodies are often spurred by the utilitarian impulse, which would
sacrifice the interest of a few individuals for the benefit of the community on the
whole. In any event, this rationale offers no doctrinal basis for concluding that
the same extortionate condition should be reviewed under a different standard
when a legislative body imposes the very same constitutional injury.”).
121. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600-01
(2013).
122. San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 104 (the court noted that the housing
replacement fee assessed under the HCO stood in sharp contrast to the
recreational facilities replacement fee in Ehrlich. In the latter, the city “relied on
no specific legislative mandate to impose the fee condition and no legislatively
set formula to calculate its size. The condition was imposed ad hoc, entirely at
the discretion of the city council and staff”).
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to legislative exactions, such as the California Supreme Court did
in San Remo Hotel with the following explanation:
Nor are plaintiffs correct that, without Nollan/Dolan/Ehrlich
scrutiny, legislatively imposed development mitigation fees are
subject to no meaningful means-ends review. As a matter of both
statutory and constitutional law, such fees must bear a reasonable relationship, in both intended use and amount, to the deleterious public impact of the development . . . While the relationship
between means and ends need not be so close or so thoroughly established for legislatively imposed fees as for ad hoc fees subject
to Ehrlich [i.e., Nollan/Dolan], the arbitrary and extortionate
use of purported mitigation fees, even where legislatively mandated, will not pass constitutional muster.”123

Thus, the concern over potential “leveraging” in the
legislative context is not a sufficient ground to apply
Nollan/Dolan to legislative exactions where such exactions are
generally applicable and are not applied with any administrative
discretion in either the imposition or the calculation of the
exaction.
C. Uniformly-Applied Legislative Exactions Are More
Like the “Financial Burdens on Property Owners” that
the Majority in Koontz Distinguished from Monetary
Exactions Relating to a “Specific Parcel of Real
Property”
The majority in Koontz distinguished between two different
types of financial burdens that government can impose on
property owners. One type, which is governed by Nollan/Dolan,
“‘operate[s] upon or alters an identified property interest’ by
directing the owner of a particular piece of property to make a
monetary payment.”124 This type of payment demand “burden[s]
the ownership of a specific parcel of land.”125 A “per se takings”
approach is proper when “the government commands the
relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property

123. Id. at 105-106 (citations omitted).
124. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599 (quoting E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,
542 (1998) (Kennedy, J.)) (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 2590 (emphasis added).
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interest.”126 Indeed, the “fulcrum” of the Koontz decision was “the
direct link between the government’s demand and a specific
parcel of real property.”127 The other type of financial burden
imposed by government on property owners, which is not
governed by Nollan/Dolan, involves “property taxes, user fees,
and similar laws and regulations that may impose financial
burdens on property owners.”128 Justice Alito juxtaposed these
two types of financial when he noted that “the power of taxation
should not be confused with the power of eminent domain,”129
and when he commented that the Court has “little trouble”
distinguishing between such powers of “eminent domain” and
“taxation.”130 That comparison highlights the Court’s clear
distinction between financial obligations that explicitly target a
specific property (i.e., eminent domain), from financial obligations
that address parcels of land generally (i.e., taxation).
Legislative exactions that do not target an “identified,”
“particular,” or “specific parcel of real property,” but apply
generally to parcels of land, are akin to “property taxes, user fees,
and similar laws and regulations.” Since Nollan/Dolan does not
apply to such generally-applied fees and taxes, legislative
exactions that apply generally, and do not target “particular,” or
“specific parcel of real property,” should not be governed by the
Nollan/Dolan standard of review. Numerous lower courts have
adopted that conclusion. For example, the concurring Justice in
Ehrlich stated:
[I]f a municipality can constitutionally impose a development tax
as long as it is rationally based, why is a higher level of constitutional scrutiny required when, as in the case of generally applicable development fees, the “tax” is earmarked for use in alleviating specific development impacts rather than for the general
fund?131

126. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 2590 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 2601.
129. Id. at 2602 (quoting Houck v. Litter River Drainage Dist., 239 U.S.
254, 264 (1915)).
130. Id. at 2602.
131. Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 455 (Cal. 1996) (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
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The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with that concurrence:
There is no principled basis on which to distinguish generally applicable development fees that fund the infrastructure expansion
needed to support new development from other legislatively imposed and generally applicable taxes, assessments, and user fees.
We therefore join the several courts in other jurisdictions that
have held that Dolan does not apply to such legislatively imposed
and calculated development fees.132

Thus, the rationales that led the U.S. Supreme Court in
Koontz to apply Nollan/Dolan to ad hoc monetary exactions and
to distinguish such exactions from general taxes, are the same
rationales that have led lower courts to make a distinction
between adjudicative exactions and legislative exactions in the
application of Nollan/Dolan.
D. The Individualized Determination Required Under
Dolan Does Not Fit the Context of Generally-Applied
Legislative Exactions
The “individualized determination” component of the roughly
proportional test in Dolan is inconsistent with legislatively
imposed development fees. Under Dolan, “the city must make
some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development.”133 Requiring such an “individualized
determination” for every proposed development that could
conceivably be impacted by a generally applied fee would be
impractical in a judicial review of such a fee.134
The case of Home Builders Assn. of Dayton and Miami Valley
v. City of Beavercreek (“Dayton”)135 illustrates the doctrinal

132. Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Washington County, 45 P.3d 966, 982 (Or. Ct.
App. 2002) (citing Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 455 (Mosk, J., concurring)).
133. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (emphasis added).
134. See e.g., City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 803 (Wash. 2006)
(refusing to apply Nollan/Dolan and holding that a state impact fee statute did
not require local governments to calculate a transportation impact fee by
making individualized assessments of a new commercial development’s direct
impact on each improvement planned in a service area).
135. See generally, Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v.
Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000).
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inconsistency
between
legislative
exactions
and
the
individualized assessment that is required under Dolan. In
Dayton, the Ohio Supreme Court purported to extend “dual
rational nexus test . . . based on the Nollan and Dolan cases” to a
generally applicable and legislatively imposed “system of impact
fees payable by developers of real estate to aid in the cost of new
roadway projects.”136 The court opined that the Dolan test was
applicable because “the appropriate test is one that balances the
interests of the city and developers of real estate without unduly
restricting local government.”137 The court explained that, under
this “dual rational nexus” test, the city must first demonstrate
that there is a “reasonable relationship between the city’s interest
in constructing new roadways and the increase in traffic
generated by new developments,” and if such a reasonable
relationship exists, “it must then be demonstrated that there is a
reasonable relationship between the impact fee imposed on a
developer and the benefits accruing to the developer from the
construction of new roadways.”138 However, in that purported
effort to apply Nollan/Dolan to the legislative exaction, the Ohio
court omitted the individualized determination that Dolan
requires. The Oregon Supreme Court later observed that the Ohio
Supreme Court’s actual application of the Nollan/Dolan test in
Dayton is “questionable”139 because the Ohio court “did not seem
to adhere to that test in its analysis.”140 That is because the
analysis in Dayton, according to the Oregon court, “is difficult to
square with Dolan and, in fact, mirrors the more deferential test
traditionally used for user fees and other purely monetary
assessments.”141 Specifically, the Oregon court noted that the
Dayton decision “made no individualized assessment of
proportionality at all but instead reviewed the legislation from a
facial perspective as it applied to developers generally.”142 Thus,
even courts that purport to apply Nollan/Dolan to legislative

136. Id. at 353, 356.
137. Id. at 355.
138. Id. at 350.
139. Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Washington County, 45 P.3d 966, 978 (Or. Ct.
App. 2002).
140. Id. at 978 n.13.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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exactions (like the Ohio court in Dayton) have struggled to comply
with the individualized assessment analysis in Dolan in the
context of legislative exactions.
E. Avoiding Undue Judicial Interference with Local Land
Use Authority Is Stronger in the Legislative Context
than it Is in the Administrative Context
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the need to avoid
judicial interference in local legislative governance. “The reasons
for deference to legislative judgments about the need for, and
likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now well
established.”143 In Lingle, the Court rejected the “substantially
advances” formula in Agins v. City of Tiburon144 for regulatory
takings under the Fifth Amendment because that formula “would
require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state
and federal regulations - a task for which courts are not well
suited,” and “would empower - and might often require - courts to
substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected
legislatures and expert agencies.”145 The Court added that “[t]he
reasons for deference to legislative judgments about the need for,
and likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now well
established.”146 That deference to legislative decision making is
another constitutional reason to avoid the application of
Nollan/Dolan to generally applied legislative exactions. Indeed,
the California Supreme Court considered that the deference the
U.S. Supreme Court grants to legislative bodies and concluded:
“Extending Nollan and Dolan generally to all government fees
affecting property value or development would open to searching
judicial scrutiny the wisdom of myriad government economic

143. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005). Earlier as
a Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Justice Alito similarly
stated that a higher judicial standard of review in the context of a substantive
due process challenge “prevents us from being cast in the role of a ‘zoning board
of appeals.’” United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, PA, 316
F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir. 2002).
144. 447 U.S. 255, 255 (1980).
145. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544.
146. Id. at 545.
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regulations, a task the courts have been loath to undertake
pursuant to either the takings or due process clause.”147
F.

After Koontz, One U.S. District Court Applied
Nollan/Dolan to a Legislative Exaction, but for the
Wrong Reasons

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California applied Nollan/Dolan to a legislative exaction in the
post-Koontz case of Levin v. City & County of San Francisco.148
While the ultimate application of Nollan/Dolan to the exaction
was correct, the rationales adopted by the District Court in
reaching that decision were not; and the court’s opinion suggests
an application of Nollan/Dolan to legislative exactions that is
overbroad.
In Levin, the District Court reviewed an ordinance that was
enacted in 2014 by the City and County of San Francisco that
required property owners wishing to withdraw their rentcontrolled property from the rental market under California’s
Ellis Act to pay a lump sum to displaced tenants.149 That 2014
147. San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 106 (Cal. 2002)
(citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Penn Central v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133 (1978); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. 428
U.S. 1, 19 (1976)). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly declined
to apply Nollan and Dolan to a city’s general storm pipe requirement, and made
a distinction between an “adjudicative determination” that is applicable solely to
individual developers and “general requirement[s] imposed through legislation,”
in part, because “[t]o extend the Nollan/Dolan analysis here would subject any
regulation governing development to higher scrutiny and raise the concern of
judicial interference with the exercise of local government police powers.”
McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
556 U.S. 1282 (2009).
148. See generally Levin v. City of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D.
Cal. 2014). The District Court’s decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, as case no. 14-17283. That appeal is pending. On appeal,
the City and County of San Francisco explicitly raises the issue of whether
“legislatively imposed conditions are not subject to Nollan/Dolan means-end
scrutiny.” Opening Brief of Appellant City and County of San Francisco at 2428, Levin v. City of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 1417283). The City argues: “[G]enerally applicable conditions are not subject to
Nollan/Dolan exactions analysis, but instead to the less stringent Penn Central
inquiry . . ..” Id. at 26.
149. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7060-7060.7 (West 2016). Under California’s Ellis
Act of 1985, government entities are restricted from “compel[ling] the owner of
any residential real property to offer, or to continue to offer, accommodations in
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Ordinance required property owners to pay the greater of a
relocation payment due under a 2005 ordinance or twenty-four
times the difference between the units’ current monthly rate and
an amount that purports to be the fair market value of a
comparable unit in San Francisco.150Although the 2014
Ordinance was generally applied, a landlord could petition the
City for a payment reduction on the grounds that the payment
would constitute an “undue financial hardship.”151Under the
specific facts in the Levin case, the plaintiff landlords were
required to pay their tenant $117,958.89 on the day the tenant
vacates the unit, under the payment formula in the 2014
Ordinance.152 Plaintiffs filed a constitutional takings claim in the
Northern District of California.
The District Court applied Nollan/Dolan to the takings
claim and found that the ordinance failed both the essential
nexus and rough proportionality tests.153 The court explained its
rationale for applying Nollan/Dolan as follows:
The Nollan/Dolan rule governs the land use restriction challenged in the instant case, in which a property owner wishing to
make a different use of a property – withdraw it from the rental
market for sale or personal use – must apply to the City for a
permit to do so. As a condition of granting the necessary Ellis Act
permit, the Ordinance requires a monetary exaction—a substantial payment, without which the property owner’s proposed new
land use is denied and the tenant continues to occupy the unit.
the property for rent or lease, except for guestrooms or efficiency units within a
residential hotel . . . .” Id. § 7060(a). But section 7060.1 provides that
“[n]otwithstanding Section 7060, nothing in this chapter” . . . “(c) [d]iminishes or
enhances any power in any public entity to mitigate any adverse impact on
persons displaced by reason of the withdrawal from rent or lease of any
accommodations.” Id. § 7060.1(c). The San Francisco Administrative Code
implements this power by requiring that, if the property owner “wishes to
withdraw from rent or lease all rental units within any detached physical
structure,” the owner must (1) serve a Notice of Termination of Tenancy on all
tenants in possession of the unit; (2) file a Notice of Intent to Withdraw Rental
Units with the San Francisco Rent Board; (3) withdraw their unit from the
rental market unless the Rent Board grants permission of rescission on the
grounds that no tenant vacated or agreed to vacate the property or that
extraordinary circumstances exist. S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 37.9(a)(13) (2016).
150. Levin, 71 F. Supp. at 1074.
151. Id. at 1077.
152. Id. at 1078.
153. Id. at 1079–89.
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As in Koontz, where the monetary exaction was subject to a Nollan/Dolan analysis because the City commanded a monetary
payment “linked to a specific, identifiable property interest such
as a . . . parcel of real property,” here the Ordinance’s requirement of a monetary payment is directly linked to a property owner’s desire to change the use of a specific, identifiable unit of
property. “Because of that direct link, this case implicates the
central concern of Nollan and Dolan” as acutely and in the same
way as the traditional land-use permitting context: the risk that
San Francisco has used its substantial power under the Ellis Act
to pursue policy goals that lack an essential nexus and rough
proportionality to the effects of a property owner withdrawing a
unit from the rental market.154

Then, in response to the City’s argument that Nollan/Dolan
“categorically” did not apply to legislatively imposed exactions155
in light of the Ninth Circuit case of McClung v. City of Sumner,156
the District Court stated: “Koontz abrogated McClung’s holding
that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to monetary exactions, which
is intertwined with and underlies McClung’s assumptions about
legislative conditions.”157 In addition, the District Court stated
that the post-Koontz decision by the Ninth Circuit in Horne v.
United States Dept. of Agriculture158 “reinforces the applicability
of the Nollan/Dolan framework to facial reviews of legislative
exactions.”159
154. Id. at 1082–83 (citing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,
133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013)).
155. Id. at 1083 n.4.
156. McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 556 U.S. 1282 (2009).
157. Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1083 n.4.
158. 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
159. Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1083 n.4. The District Court reasoned:
In Horne, the Ninth Circuit reviewed and rejected a takings challenge to a Marketing Order that required raisin producers to hold
back a certain amount of their crop from the market. There, the
Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the Order satisfied the Nollan/Dolan essential nexus and rough proportionality tests. In so doing, the court explained that Dolan’s individualized review of a particular land-permit condition made sense there, because “in the land
use context . . . the development of each parcel is considered on a
case-by-case basis. But here, the [raisin] use restriction is imposed
evenly across the industry; all producers must contribute an equal
percentage of their overall crop to the reserve pool.”. The court went

35

272

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

In Levin, the District Court’s application of Nollan/Dolan to
the plaintiffs’ takings challenge is ultimately correct, but not for
the reasons stated in that opinion. The Nollan/Dolan test should
apply in that case because of the substantial discretion that is
afforded the City’s administration in subjectively exempting
particular landlords from the payment requirements of the 2014
Ordinance based on the specific financial condition of those
landlords. That variance-like procedure does not appear to have
been considered by the court in its determination of whether to
apply Nollan/Dolan to the 2014 Ordinance. However, the
rationales expressed by the District Court in suggesting a broad
“applicability of the Nollan/Dolan framework to facial reviews of
legislative exactions” is flawed for the following three (3) reasons.
First, the Levin court’s application of Koontz to legislative
exactions is too broad. The District Court equated the description
in Koontz about government commands for the relinquishment of
funds that are “linked to a specific, identifiable property interest
such as a bank account or parcel of real property”160 with the
2014 Ordinance’s requirement of a monetary payment that is
“directly linked to a property owner’s desire to change the use of a
specific, identifiable unit of property.”161 In a similar manner, the
District Court equated the language in Koontz about “the effects
of the proposed new use of the specific property at issue”162 with
“the effects of a property owner withdrawing a unit from the
rental market” in light of the 2014 Ordinance.163 Unlike the
Supreme Court in Koontz (relying on Eastern Enterprises), the
District Court in Levin did not focus on whether the exaction
targeted an “identified,” “particular,” or “specific parcel of real
property.”164 Instead, Levin focused on the effect of the exaction
on the “choices” of the property owners that seek to use the
properties that were impacted by the generally-applied legislative
on to conclude that the Marketing Order was tailored to the government interests under Nollan/Dolan because it varied the reserve requirement annually in accordance with market conditions.
Id. (quoting Horne, 750 F.3d at 1143-44).
160. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600
(2013).
161. Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1083.
162. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600.
163. Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1083.
164. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599–600.
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exaction.165 That “choices” rationale is flawed because it would
necessarily sweep into the Nollan/Dolan analysis all “property
taxes, user fees, and similar laws and regulations that may
impose financial burdens on property owners.”166 Such generallyapplied financial burdens on property owners will necessarily
have an effect on the “choices” of those property owners as to how
they will use their property. Thus, the District Court erred in its
application of Nollan/Dolan to the 2014 Ordinance when it
looked to the property owners’ “choices” that are impacted by the
legislative exaction, instead of looking to whether the exaction
explicitly targeted an “identified,” “particular,” or “specific parcel
of real property.”167
Second, the Levin court’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Horne is misplaced. In Horne, the court considered a
takings challenge to a marketing order imposed by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture on California producers of certain
raisins. That marketing order required that the producers divert
a percentage of their annual crop to a reserve, and allowed the
Secretary to impose a penalty on producers who failed to comply
with that diversion program.168 The Ninth Circuit refused to
apply a per se takings analysis to a legal challenge by raisin
growers, and instead applied the Nollan/Dolan standard of
review.169 The court reasoned that the Takings Clause affords
less protection to personal than to real property, and that the
165. The Levin court explained:
As in Nollan, Dolan, and Horne, the challenged Ordinance requires a
conditional exaction: the loss of substantial funds or physical control
over the landlord’s unit. All conditionally grant a government benefit
in exchange for the exaction, which here takes the form of the Ellis
Act permit that the landlord must have in order to withdraw property from the rental market. “And, critically, all” of these cases “involve choice”: the Nollans could have continued to lease their property with the existing structure, Ms. Dolan could have left her store
and parking lot unchanged, the Hornes could have avoided the Marketing Order by planting different crops, and the Levins and Park
Lane can avoid paying the exaction by subjecting their property to
continued occupation by an unwanted tenant.
Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1083 (citations omitted).
166. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2601.
167. Id. at 2599–600.
168. Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.
2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
169. Id. at 1139–41.
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reserve requirement “is a use restriction applying to the
[plaintiffs] insofar as they voluntarily choose to send their raisins
into the stream of interstate commerce.”170 The court explained
that Nollan, Dolan and this case all involved “conditional
exaction” and “choice.”171 However, contrary to the suggestion by
the U.S. District Court in Levin, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Horne is not authority on the legislative exaction issue. The case
did not involve a legislative exaction, but rather involved a
marketing order that was made by a “Raisin Administrative
Committee” that was comprised of “forty-seven industrynominated representatives” appointed by the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture,172 which is different both in structure
and in function from elected legislative bodies. Also, the Ninth
Circuit did not consider whether the Koontz analysis applies to
legislative exactions, and did not discuss the distinctions between
legislative and adjudicative exactions that numerous other courts
have made. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Horne on several grounds, inter alia,
that the marketing regulation constituted a “clear physical
taking” that applies to personal property.173 In other words,
Horne is a physical takings case and not a regulatory takings case
that is subject to Nollan/Dolan review. Thus, contrary to the
District Court’s analysis in Levin, the Horne decision by the
Ninth Circuit does not provide any authority for the proposition
that Nollan/Dolan applies to legislative exactions.
Third, the Levin court’s cursory dismissal of the Ninth
Circuit’s discussion of legislative exactions in McClung is
incorrect. While Levin accurately noted that Koontz abrogated the
holding in McClung that monetary exactions do not fall within
Nollan/Dolan,174 the District Court incorrectly concluded that
such holding in McClung is “intertwined with and underlies
McClung’s assumptions about legislative conditions.”175 That is

170. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1142.
171. Id. at 1143.
172. Id. at 1133 n.3.
173. Id. at 2425–431.
174. Levin v. City of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1083 n.4 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (citing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586,
2594 (2013)).
175. Id.
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because the Ninth Circuit in McClung discussed the
legislative/adjudicative distinction apart from the “monetary”
nature of the particular exactions in that case.176 Levin
overlooked that discussion. Levin also avoids those cases that
have made a distinction between legislative and adjudicative
exactions in determining whether to apply Nollan/Dolan to
legislative exactions, which cases (such as San Remo Hotel) were
cited in McClung.177
In short, while the District Court’s decision in Levin to apply
Nollan/Dolan to the 2014 Ordinance is correct due to the
administrative variance-type procedure that is contained within
that ordinance, the court erred in suggesting that Koontz
warrants a broad “applicability of the Nollan/Dolan framework
to facial reviews of legislative exactions.”
G. Thus, to Avoid Nollan/Dolan, a Legislative Exaction
Must Be Generally Applied, and Must Establish a Set
Formula that is Applied Without Any Meaningful
Administrative Discretion
The Nollan/Dolan test should apply to exactions that are ad
hoc adjudicatory monetary demands on land use permittees, even
if such demands are enacted by legislative bodies.However,
Nollan/Dolan should not govern exactions that (1) are generally
applied, and (2) are based on a set legislative formula that is
applied to specific development projects without any meaningful
administrative discretion. Those two criteria are discussed below.

176. For example, the McClung decision included the following discussion:
Next, the McClungs attempt to recast the facts as involving an individualized, discretionary exaction as opposed to a general requirement imposed through legislation. The McClungs make this argument in recognition of the fact that at least some courts have drawn
a distinction between adjudicatory exactions and legislative fees,
which have less chance of abuse due to their general application. The
facts do not support the McClungs falling within the former category. All new developments must have at least 12-inch storm pipe;
there is no evidence on the record that the McClungs were singled
out.
McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
556 U.S. 1282 (2009) (citations omitted).
177. Id. at 1228.
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First, in order to avoid Nollan/Dolan, a legislative exaction
must be generally applied. A number of lower courts have
recognized that the political process inherent in the adoption of
legislative exactions operates as protection against extortionate
demands on land-use applicants.178 However, the strength of that
“political process” rationale diminishes as the legislative exaction
becomes more narrowly applied. Even those courts that decline to
apply Nollan/Dolan to legislative exactions recognize that such
exactions are not “generally applicable” if they target specific
properties or developers.179 Indeed, the Court has emphasized the
Takings Clause’s role “in ‘barring Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’”180 Justice
Stevens explained in his dissent in Lucas that “one of the central
concerns of our takings jurisprudence is ‘prevent[ing] the public
from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the
burdens of government,’” and “[w]e have, therefore, in our takings
law frequently looked to the generality of a regulation of
property.”181 Accordingly, Justice Stevens noted that “[i]n
analyzing takings claims, courts have long recognized the
difference between a regulation that targets one or two parcels of
land and a regulation that enforces a statewide policy.”182
Professor Echeverria summarizes Justice Stevens’ view this way:
“so long as regulation applies broadly across a community, there
should be a strong presumption that the regulation represents a
178. See infra Part III.B.
179. For example, in McClung, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused
to apply the Nollan/Dolan standard to a city ordinance’s “across-the-board”
requirement that all new developments include a minimum of 12-inch storm
pipes. 548 F.3d at 1228. When the plaintiffs attempted to recast the facts as
involving “an individualized, discretionary exaction as opposed to a general
requirement imposed through legislation,” the court explained: “The facts do not
support the [plaintiffs] falling within the former category. All new developments
must have at least 12-inch storm pipe; there is no evidence on the record that
the [plaintiffs] were singled out.” Id. at 1228–29.
180. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
181. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071–72 (1992) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (alteration in original); see also id. at 1072 n.7 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“This principle of generality is well rooted in our broader
understandings of the Constitution as designed in part to control the ‘mischiefs
of faction.’”).
182. Id. at 1073 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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legitimate outcome of the political process rather than the high
jacking of the process by some special interest.”183 That view is
consistent with the California Supreme Court in San Remo Hotel
and the Oregon Supreme Court in Rogers Machinery, discussed
above. Thus, in order for a legislative exaction to not be an
“extortionate demand” like the ad hoc administrative exaction in
Koontz that required the application of Nollan/Dolan, the
legislative exaction must be generally applicable and must not
single out a few projects or properties (i.e., “some people”).184
Second, in order to prevent a legislative exaction from
becoming an “extortionate demand” that is subject to
Nollan/Dolan, there must not be any meaningful discretion in
the application of the exaction to specific projects or properties.185
The Court’s concern regarding administrative discretion is
evident in Justice Alito’s explanation in Koontz that “land-use
permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits because
the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit that
is worth far more than property it would like to take.”186 The
relevance of administrative discretion is also apparent in the
exchange during oral argument between Petitioner’s counsel and
Justice Sotomayor. The Justice asked: “So what happens in just –
when the legislature passes a development fee? Are you, now,

183. John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. OF
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 193 (2005). Professor Eagle similarly notes that “finegrained ordinances setting out requisites for development” may lack judicial
deference because they would constitute “spot zoning.” Eagle, supra note 115, at
24.
184. In most cases the difference between the two should be apparent.
Professor Ilya Somin describes the distinction between “broad-based property
taxes or user fees that apply to all property owners, or to all users of a particular
public service, and narrowly targeted exactions that single out individual
landowners or small groups” as follows: “[a]lthough the precise line between the
two may be elusive, most real-world cases are likely to fall clearly on one side or
the other of this continuum.” Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor
Relation” of Constitutional Law: Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future
of the Takings Clause, CATO SUPREME CT. REV. 215, 239 (2013).
185. See, e.g., Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 694
(Colo. 2001) (“. . .the District Manager [of a sanitation district] validly calculated
[developers’] specific assessment according to a publicly promulgated conversion
framework.”).
186. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594
(2013) (emphasis added).
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saying that’s subject to Nollan and Dolan, too?”187 Petitioner’s
counsel responded: “If the legislation requires an agency who
processes the permit to impose a fee in exchange for a permit –
again, within the land-use context, we are not talking about
taxes, homeowners’ fees, we are talking within the discretionary
land-use process – that is imposed there, then the risk of coercion,
undue influence, and the like arise, and Nollan and Dolan should
apply.”188 Thus, even Petitioner’s counsel in Koontz recognized a
connection between “the risk of coercion, undue influence, and the
like” and the “discretionary” land-use process. That is because the
existence of administrative discretion in the application of a
legislative exaction raises the same potential for coercion and
“extortionate demands” as an adjudicative exaction.
For example, the Texas Supreme Court applied
Nollan/Dolan to a legislative exaction, inter alia, because of the
administrative discretion that was allowed in the application of
that exaction to specific projects. In Town Of Flower Mound v.
Stafford Estates Ltd Partnership, the Texas court found no
meaningful distinction between the conditions imposed in Nollan
and Dolan (which involved “general authority taking into account
individual circumstances”) and the requirement in a town
ordinance that conditioned the approval of a subdivision
development on the general requirement that all developers
construct concrete streets.189 However, the ordinance contained
an exception to that development requirement if the Town’s
Council found and determined “that such standards work a
hardship” due to the “costs” and “other related factors” resulting
from the imposition of that requirement in individual cases.190
The Town denied the request by the plaintiff developer for an
exception to that requirement, even though the Town “had
exercised its discretion to grant exceptions to other developers on
a project-by-project basis.”191 The Texas court explained the

187. Transcript of Petitioner Oral Argument at 58, Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447).
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d
620, 641 (Tex. 2004).
190. Id. at 624 (quoting FLOWER MOUND, TEX., CODE, ch.12 § 4.04(a) (1994)
(now codified at CODE § 90-301 (2002)).
191. Id. at 624.
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relevance of that discretionary element in the application of the
Nollan/Dolan test:
The Town was authorized to grant, and did grant, exceptions to
the general requirement that roads abutting subdivisions be improved to specified standards. Stafford applied for an exception
and was refused, but the Town nevertheless considered whether
an exception was appropriate. [¶] The Town argues that if the
government is to be held to the stricter Dolan standard because it
tries to tailor general requirements to individual circumstances that is, because it sometimes grants variances - it will be less inclined to do so, thereby inflicting one-size-fits-all shoes onto very
different feet. But it is precisely for this reason that we decline to
adopt a bright-line adjudicative/legislative distinction.192

The application of Nollan/Dolan in Town of Flower Mound therefore depended, in part, on the fact that the Town’s administrative
staff had the discretion to decide who should have to follow the
otherwise generally-applied legislative exaction.193 That application of Nollan/Dolan to a legislative exaction is consistent with
the rationale in San Remo Hotel, where the California Supreme
Court declined to apply Nollan/Dolan to a legislative in lieu fee

192. Id. at 641–42 (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825,
835 n.4 (1987)).
193. In Twin Lakes Development Corporation v. Town of Monroe, the Court
of Appeals of New York similarly applied Nollan/Dolan to a legislative exaction
that had a built-in discretionary administrative component. There, the New
York court affirmed summary judgment against a developer that brought a
takings challenge against a town code requirement that an applicant for a
subdivision permit pay a per-lot in lieu fee where the town’s planning board
determines that parkland dedication is not appropriate. Twin Lakes Dev Corp v.
Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821, 822 (N.Y. 2003). Without any discussion as to
whether Nollan/Dolan should even apply in that legislative context, the court
simply adjudicated the case under that standard. Id. The Plaintiff developer
argued that the fee constituted an unconstitutional taking, in part, because the
amount of the fee was not based on an individualized consideration under Dolan
of the recreational needs generated by its subdivision plan and thus is not
roughly proportional to those needs. Id. at 824. The court rejected that
argument because the planning board made a finding that led to the imposition
of the in-lieu fee rather than a parkland dedication, and such findings “reflect
the individualized consideration of the project’s impact contemplated by Dolan.”
Id. at 825.
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as there “is no meaningful government discretion [that] enters into either the imposition or the calculation of the in lieu fee.”194
Thus, the general consensus appears to be that the
Nollan/Dolan test should apply to a legislative exaction where a
project applicant/property owner is treated uniquely either in the
imposition of the exaction, or in the exception from the exaction.
Both situations involve administrative discretion that carry the
threat of “extortionate demands,”195 even though the exaction is
initially created in the legislative process. However, legislative
exactions that do not include any meaningful discretion in their
administration (either in their application or in an exception to
their application) should not be governed by Nollan/Dolan.
IV. THE DEFAULT PENN CENTRAL ANALYSIS
SHOULD NOT GOVERN GENERALLY APPLIED
AND DISCRETIONLESS LEGISLATIVE
EXACTIONS
A. Penn Central is the Default Standard of Review for
Takings Cases
In various cases, the Court has made general statements to
the effect that the multi-factored analysis in Penn Central is the
“default” test that determines whether a regulatory action
constitutes a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment. For example,
in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,196 Justice O’Connor explained in a
concurring opinion: “Our polestar instead remains the principles
194. San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 104 (Cal. 2002);
see, e.g., Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 696 (Colo. 2001)
(Nollan/Dolan does not apply to Colorado state’s sanitation plant investment
fee where “[t]he General Assembly authorized the fee and the District assessed
it under the terms of a publicly promulgated conversion schedule”; and
“[n]either the promulgation of the conversion schedule, nor the calculation of the
[individual property owner’s] [fee] assessment by the assigned administrative
official, constituted a discretionary adjudicative activity.”).
195. It could be argued that a “legislative exaction” that involves
administrative discretion is not really a “legislative exaction” at all. However, it
is important to interpret legislative exactions in light of the degree of
administrative discretion that is built into the legislation in order to address the
concern of some courts that there may not be a clear “adjudicative/legislative
distinction” for purposes of determining the proper standard of judicial review.
See, e.g., Town of Flower Mound, 133 S.W.3d at 642.
196. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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set forth in Penn Central itself and our other cases that govern
partial regulatory takings.”197 The dissent in Koontz similarly
recognized that “[c]laims that government regulations violate the
Takings Clause by unduly restricting the use of property are
generally ‘governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City,’”198 and that the “function of Penn
Central” is to “address excessive regulatory burdens on land
use.”199 The Lingle Court more specifically explained that,
outside the “two relatively narrow categories” of a physical
invasion of property and of a deprivation of all economically
beneficial use of property under Lucas, and other than the
“special context of land-use exactions” in Nollan/Dolan,
“regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set
forth in Penn Central . . . .”200 In light of such statements, it is not
surprising that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in
an unreported decision in 2010 that “the proper framework” for
analyzing whether a “generally applicable development fee” was a
taking is “the fact-specific inquiry developed by the Supreme
Court in Penn Central . . . .”201
197. Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
198. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2604
(2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005)).
199. Id. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
200. Lingle, at 538; see id. at 539 (the Penn Central factors “have served as
the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall
within the physical takings or Lucas rules”); id. at 548 (“[A] plaintiff seeking to
challenge a government regulation as an uncompensated taking of private
property may proceed under one of the other theories discussed above—by
alleging a ‘physical’ taking, a Lucas-type ‘total regulatory taking,’ a Penn
Central taking, or a land-use exaction violating the standards set forth in
Nollan and Dolan.”); see also Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 511, 518 (2012) (“[W]e have drawn some bright lines, notably, the rule that a
permanent physical occupation of property authorized by government is a
taking. So, too, is a regulation that permanently requires a property owner to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses of his or her land. But aside from the
cases attended by rules of this order, most takings claims turn on situationspecific factual inquiries.” (citing, inter alia, Penn Central v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978)); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (citing Penn Central for the
proposition that “[w]here a regulation places limitations on land that fall short
of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have
occurred, depending on a complex of factors . . . .”).
201. Mead v. City of Cotati, No. 09-15005, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15201, at
*4–5 (9th Cir. July 22, 2010) (citing McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219,
1225 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1282 (2009)).
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B. However, the Penn Central Analysis Should Not
Govern Generally-Applied Legislative Exactions
Despite those general statements by the Court, legislative
exactions should not be governed by the Penn Central analysis for
the following three (3) reasons.
First, because the Penn Central analysis is “situationspecific”202 and “essentially ad hoc,”203 it is not designed to
address generally-applied legislative exactions. For example,
Lingle explained that the “primary” Penn Central factor is “[t]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations.”204 Thus, just as
the “individualized determination” under Nollan/Dolan renders
that standard inapplicable to generally-applied legislative
exactions for the reasons discussed above,205 so too the “situationspecific” analysis under Penn Central makes the latter ill-suited
for judicial review of legislative exactions of general applicability.
Second, the Penn Central analysis is too inherently uncertain
and gives rise to too many “vexing subsidiary questions”206 to be
practical in the context of legislative exactions. Professor Eagle
notes that the Penn Central doctrine “remains under-theorized,
subjective, with its factors mutually referential, and unable to
provide a reliable guide to courts or litigants,” and that the
doctrine “has become a compilation of moving parts that are
neither individually coherent nor collectively compatible.”207 For
example, in Koontz, Justice Alito expressed relief that the Court

202. Ark. Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 518.
203. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
204. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39 (emphasis added); see also Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 633–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he regulatory regime in place at
the time the claimant acquires the property at issue” is relevant to the “degree
of interference with investment-backed expectations” element of the Penn
Central analysis. Also, “[e]valuation of the degree of interference with
investment-backed expectations instead is one factor that points toward the
answer to the question whether the application of a particular regulation to
particular property ‘goes too far.’”) (emphasis added).
205. See infra Part III.D.
206. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39 (citing Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18, 63234 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
207. Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings
Test, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 601, 601-02 (2014).
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“need not apply Penn Central’s ‘essentially ad hoc, factual
inquir[y],’ at all, much less extend that ‘already difficult and
uncertain rule’ to the ‘vast category of cases’ in which someone
believes that a regulation is too costly.”208 Justice Alito’s
comment suggests that the Court would be reluctant to apply the
“difficult and uncertain rule” in Penn Central to legislative
exactions. That makes sense because judicial standards of review
should be applied in a manner that affords clarity to legislatures
in how to enact land use exactions that are constitutionally valid.
Just as legislation must have sufficient clarity so as to give fair
warning to the public as to what activities are prohibited in order
to pass constitutional muster,209 so too should judicial standards
of review give clarity to legislatures where the constitutional lines
are drawn for legislative exactions. Just like the Court
purposefully “construe[s] [ambiguous] statutes [as necessary] to
avoid constitutional questions,”210 so too the Court should apply
non-ambiguous standards of review to legislative exactions so as
to allow legislatures to avoid unconstitutional takings. Thus, the
Court should provide a non-ambiguous standard of review to
determine whether generally applied and discretionless exactions
constitute takings under the Fifth Amendment. The Penn Central
analysis does not provide such a standard.
Third, the prevalence of legislative exactions is so widespread
that the Court should avoid its usual predisposition to “generally
eschew[] any “ ‘set formula’ “ for determining how far is too
208. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600
(2013) (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 542 (1998) (opinion of
Kennedy, J.)) (emphasis added).
209. See generally United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266–67 (1997).
210. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 328 (2010); see
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal.,
508 U.S. 602, 628–29 (1993) (“It is a hoary one that in a case of statutory
ambiguity, ‘where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.’ ‘Federal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of
their constitutionality. “When the validity of an act of Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”‘“ (citations
omitted)); see also Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974)
(“[W]hen a statute is ambiguous, ‘construction should go in the direction of
constitutional policy.’”) (citation omitted)).
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far.”211 Generally, the Court “resist[s] the temptation to adopt per
se rules in our cases involving partial regulatory takings,
preferring to examine ‘a number of factors’ rather than a simple
‘mathematically precise’ formula.”212 Penn Central, itself, is based
on the Court’s decision to eschew “any ‘set formula’ for
determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons.”213 However, that judicial policy of avoiding
formulaic takings rules should not govern legislative exactions.
As the dissent in Koontz pointed out, the constitutional standard
of review applied to land use exactions impacts “every decision by
every local government to require a person seeking a permit to
pay or spend money.”214 What is at stake, according to the Koontz
dissent, is the potential that the Court could end up diminishing
“the flexibility of state and local governments to take the most
routine actions to enhance their communities . . . .”215 The
widespread impact of the constitutional standard of review in the
legislative takings context, coupled with Justice Kennedy’s
observation that “[c]ases attempting to decide when a regulation
becomes a taking are among the most litigated and perplexing in
current law,”216 collectively means that widespread constitutional
litigation can be expected in the legislative exactions context if
the Penn Central analysis is applied. Thus, the appropriate
standard of judicial review for generally-applied and
discretionless legislative exactions should not be Penn Central,
but should be a “set formula.”
Accordingly, the Penn Central “factors” analysis is
inappropriate in the legislative exaction context. Instead, a set
formula for legislative exactions is warranted. Indeed, Professor
211. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (quoting
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
212. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 326 (2002).
213. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 594 (1962)).
214. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2608
(2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 2607 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
216. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in judgment and dissenting in part).
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Echeverria points out that per se rules in takings cases assist
local agencies in drafting legislation: “Even from a perspective of
defenders of government regulatory authority, this approach had
the potential benefit of identifying actions that would be safely
immune from takings liability – assuming these per se tests came
to define not only the grounds, but also the outer limits, of
takings liability.”217 The Court should design a ‘set formula’
standard of review that constitutes both the “grounds” and “outer
limits” of constitutional takings in the legislative exactions
context. As discussed below, the reasonable relationship test that
has been adopted by several states constitutes such a standard of
review.
V. A REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TEST SHOULD
GOVERN GENERALLY-APPLIED AND
DISCRETIONLESS LEGISLATIVE EXACTIONS
Since neither the Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny test, nor
the “default” Penn Central analysis, should govern generallyapplied and discretionless legislative exactions, as explained
above, the Court should therefore fashion a “takings” standard of
review that is tailored to such legislative exactions. Such a
standard must satisfy the two fundamental “takings” criteria
explained in Lingle. Prior to Lingle, the Court had declared in
Agins v. Tiburon218 that government regulation of private
property “effects a taking if [such regulation] does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . .”219 However,
the Court reversed course in Lingle, concluding that “the
‘substantially advances’ formula announced in Agins is not a
valid method of identifying regulatory takings for which the Fifth
Amendment requires just compensation.”220 According to Lingle,
the formula in Agins “prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due
process, not a takings, test,”221 examines the validity of a
217. Echeverria, supra note 171, at 173.
218. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
219. Id. at 260.
220. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532, 536–45 (2005).
221. Id. at 540. See also id. (Agins formula “was derived from due process,
not takings, precedents”); id. at 542 (“The ‘substantially advances’ formula
suggests a means-ends test: It asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private
property is effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose. An inquiry of
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regulation in a manner that “is logically prior to and distinct from
the question whether a regulation effects a taking”222, and does
not involve the key examination of whether the governmental
regulation forces “some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole.”223 In rejecting the Agins formula, the Court in Lingle
outlined the two key elements that must be included in any
“takings” standard of review: “[T]he ‘substantially advances’
inquiry [in Agins] reveals nothing about the [1] magnitude or
character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon
private property rights. Nor does it provide any information about
[2] how any regulatory burden is distributed among property
owners.”224 The Court repeated: “A test that tells us nothing
about the actual burden imposed on property rights, or how that
burden is allocated, cannot tell us when justice might require
that the burden be spread among taxpayers through the payment
of compensation.”225 Thus, the standard of review that the Court
should apply to legislative exactions must address those two
elements.
In determining the proper standard of review for legislative
exactions, the Supreme Court should consider the approaches
taken by various states. That is what the Court did when it
developed the analogous “roughly proportional” test in Dolan.226
this nature has some logic in the context of a due process challenge, for a
regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so
arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause. But such a
test is not a valid method of discerning whether private property has been
‘taken’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
222. Id. at 543.
223. Id. at 536 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)).
224. Id. at 542 (emphasis in original). The court further explained that “the
‘substantially advances’ inquiry before us now is unconcerned with the degree or
type of burden a regulation places upon property . . . .” Id. at 547.
225. Id. at 543.
226. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389–91 (1994) (“Since state
courts have been dealing with this question a good deal longer than we have, we
turn to representative decisions made by them.”); see generally Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2602 (2013) (“Numerous
courts—including courts in many of our Nation’s most populous States—have
confronted constitutional challenges to monetary exactions over the last two
decades and applied the standard from Nollan and Dolan or something like it”);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 839 (1987) (Court’s conclusion that
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This author suggests that the Court adopt a “reasonable
relationship” test like that which has been applied to legislative
exactions in the states of California, Colorado, and Ohio.
In California, the Mitigation Fee Act provides a statutory
reasonable relationship requirement that applies to legislative
exactions.227 The statute requires that a local agency must
determine “‘how there is a ‘reasonable relationship’ between the
proposed use of a given exaction and both ‘the type of
development project’ and ‘the need for the public facility and the
type of development project on which the fee is imposed.’”228 The
California Supreme Court summarized that statutory test as
follows: “fees must bear a reasonable relationship, in both
intended use and amount, to the deleterious public impact of the
development.”229 Indeed, Penn Central appeared to suggest such
a test when the U.S. Supreme Court declared that “a use
restriction on real property may constitute a ‘taking’ if not
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose.”230
the California Coastal Commission’s imposition of a permit condition cannot be
treated as an exercise of its land-use power “is consistent with the approach
taken by every other court that has considered the question, with the exception
of the California state courts” (citing numerous state authorities)).
227. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 66001(a)–(b), 66005(a), 66006(c) (West 2016).
228. Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 436–37 (Cal. 1996) (Arabian, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 66001(a)(3)–(4)) (emphasis in
original); see also Homebuilders Ass’n of Tulare/Kings Ctys., Inc. v. City of
Lemoore, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 14 (2010) (“The Mitigation Fee Act requires the
local agency to identify the purpose of the fee and the use to which the fee will
be put. The local agency must also determine that both ‘the fee’s use’ and ‘the
need for the public facility’ are reasonably related to the type of development
project on which the fee is imposed. In addition, the local agency must
‘determine how there is a reasonable relationship between the amount of the fee
and the cost of the public facility or portion of the public facility attributable to
the development on which the fee is imposed.’”) (internal citations omitted).
229. San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002);
see also Homebuilders Ass’n of Tulare/Kings Ctys., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 15
(“[B]efore imposing a fee under the Mitigation Fee Act, the local agency is
charged with determining that the amount of the fee and the need for the public
facility are reasonably related to the burden created by the development
project.”).
230. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
Cf. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (“[U]nless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a
valid regulation of land use by ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’”) (quoting
J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981).
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In Colorado, a similar statutory reasonable relationship test
has been applied. For example, in Krupp v. Breckenridge
Sanitation District, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a
legislatively imposed sanitation plant investment fee was not
governed by Nollan/Dolan, but was instead governed a state
statute that required that “the amount of the fee must be
reasonably related to the overall cost of the service.”231 Under
that reasonableness standard, “[m]athematical exactitude is not
required, however, and the particular mode adopted by the
governmental entity in assessing the fee is generally a matter of
legislative discretion.”232 Judicial review under that standard
presumed that the governmental body “may rationally
distinguish between different types of projects in setting its
rates,” and that the courts “will not set aside the methodology
chosen by an entity with ratemaking authority unless it is
inherently unsound.”233
The Ohio Supreme Court similarly applied a two-part
reasonable relationship test to a legislative exaction in Dayton
(even though the court incorrectly considered that test to be an
administration of Nollan/Dolan).234 The Ohio court explained
that, under that test, “the city must first demonstrate that there
is a reasonable relationship between the city’s interest in
constructing new roadways and the increase in traffic generated
by new developments,” and if such a reasonable relationship
exists, “it must then be demonstrated that there is a reasonable
relationship between the impact fee imposed by [the city] and the
benefits accruing to the developer from the construction of new
roadways.”235
Those various forms of the reasonable relationship test
applied in California, Colorado, and Ohio avoid the shortcomings
231. 19 P.3d 687, 693–94 (Colo. 2001) (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 694.
233. Id. In Krupp, the court found that the fee at issue satisfied that
“reasonably related” standard: “We conclude that the [fee] is established by
legislative authority, and is reasonably related to the specific government
service of providing wastewater collection and treatment to new developments
within the District. It rationally differentiates between different classes of
buildings based upon anticipated peak wastewater flows per unit.” Id.
234. See infra Part III.D.
235. Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek,
729 N.E.2d 349, 356 (Ohio 2000).
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of the Nollan/Dolan and Penn Central standards of review in the
legislative exaction context. The reasonable relationship test not
only avoids the judicial interference with local land-use decisions
that so troubled the dissent in Koontz, but it also alleviates the
Court’s concern that land-use exactions may go “too far” and
become “extortionate demands” on property owners.
Furthermore, the reasonable relationship test satisfies the
two elements that Lingle required for any “takings” standard of
review. First, the reasonable relationship test considers the
actual burden imposed on property rights. For example, under
the California Mitigation Fee Act, the fee determination process
by the legislative body “will necessarily involve predictions
regarding population trends and future building costs,” and
therefore “it is not to be expected that the figures will be
exact.”236 On review, courts “will not concern themselves with [a
local] agency’s methods for compiling and evaluating scientific
data.”237 Instead, a court “must be able to assure itself that before
imposing the fee the [local agency] engaged in a reasoned
analysis designed to establish the requisite connection between
the amount of the fee imposed and the burden created.”238 Thus,

236. Shapell Indus., Inc. v. Governing Bd. of the Milpitas Unified Sch.
Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818, 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
237. Id. at 835.
238. Id. at 827. See Homebuilders Assn. of Tulare/Kings Ctys. v. City of
Lemoore, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 15-16 (“If such a fee is challenged, the local agency
has the burden of producing evidence in support of its determination. The local
agency must show that a valid method was used for imposing the fee in
question, one that established a reasonable relationship between the fee charged
and the burden posed by the development. [¶] [¶] [¶] In general, the imposition
of various monetary exactions, such as special assessments, user fees, and
impact fees, is accorded substantial judicial deference. In the absence of a
legislative shifting of the burden of proof, a plaintiff challenging an impact fee
has to show that the record before the local agency clearly did not support the
underlying determinations regarding the reasonableness of the relationship
between the fee and the development. [¶] Accordingly, the local agency has the
initial burden of producing evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it used a
valid method for imposing the fee in question, one that established a reasonable
relationship between the fee charged and the burden posed by the development.
If the local agency does not produce evidence sufficient to avoid a ruling against
it on the validity of the fee, the plaintiff challenging the fee will prevail.
However, if the local agency’s evidence is sufficient, the plaintiff must establish
a requisite degree of belief in the mind of the trier of fact or the court that the
fee is invalid, e.g., that the fee’s use and the need for the public facility are not
reasonably related to the development project on which the fee is imposed or the
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the local legislative body in California has “the initial burden of
producing evidence of the reasonableness of the relationship
between the fee charged and the burden posed by the
development,” and the party challenging the fee has “the burden
of proving that the record before the [local body] did not support
the [local body’s] underlying determinations.”239 Second, the
reasonable relationship test satisfies the second element in Lingle
regarding how regulatory burdens are distributed among
property owners. For example, when it adopted that test in the
Mitigation Fee Act, the California Legislature was motivated, in
part, by the development community’s concern “that local
agencies were imposing development fees for purposes unrelated
to development projects.”240 Thus, the public policies advanced by

amount of the fee bears no reasonable relationship to the cost of the public
facility attributable to the development.” (citations omitted)).
239. Id. at 16; see, e.g., Cresta Bella, LP v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 160
Cal. Rptr. 3d 437, 447–49 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2013) (school impact fee
imposed on a residential development project involving the demolition of an
existing apartment complex and construction of a new, larger apartment
complex held invalid under the “reasonable relationship” standard in section
66001, subdivision (a), of the Act to the extent the fees were imposed on
preexisting square footage, because the school district failed to show that
replacement of the preexisting square footage would generate new students);
Home Builders Assn. of Tulare/Kings Ctys., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 23–24
(legislatively imposed fire protection impact fee on the west side of the city was
valid under the Act because the city’s analysis showed that additional facilities
were needed to serve the new development on the west side; but the same fee for
the east side of the city was invalid under the Act because the existing facilities
“are already adequate to continue to provide the same level of service” and “the
new development will not burden the current facilities”).
240. Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 436 (Cal. 1996) (Arabian, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting Centex Real Estate Corp. v. City of Vallejo, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 48, 49-50 (1993), citing S. Comm. on Local Govt., analysis of AB 1600,
1987–1988 Reg. Sess. (1987), at 1). The Mitigation Fee Act arose out of a joint
legislative hearing, the purpose of which was:
[T]o generate ideas for an equitable means of financing infrastructure. Chairman Cortese opened the hearing with the comment that
he anticipated a positive discussion “that points us towards a legislative solution to our current public facility financing problems.” Cortese said that any fees imposed by local governments should be “in
the spirit of Proposition 13” and not exceed the cost of the service
provided . . . . Senator Bergeson also expressed concern that the current reliance on developer fees may unfairly shift the cost of growth
to new homebuyers, but a limitation on these fees may unintentionally limit the growth that some communities desire.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/1

54

2017]

LET’S BE REASONABLE

291

the California Legislature in the reasonable relationship test
mirror the two “realities of the permitting process” that undergird
the Court’s decision in Koontz.241
VI. CONCLUSION
Significant uncertainty exists after Koontz as to whether the
U.S. Supreme Court will extend the heightened scrutiny of the
Nollan/Dolan test to legislatively-imposed monetary exactions. As
Justice Thomas advised in early 2016, the Court must act at “the
earliest practicable opportunity”242 to address that uncertainty
and to remove what Justice Kagan calls “a cloud on every decision
by every local government to require a person seeking a permit to
pay or spend money.”243 By applying the rationales expressed in
Koontz, and by taking note of how the majority of lower courts
have addressed the issue, the Court should find that neither the
heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan, nor the Penn Central
factored analysis, should govern legislative exactions that (1) are
generally applied, and (2) are based on a set legislative formula
that provides no meaningful discretion to administrators in its
application to specific properties. Legislative exactions that
satisfy those two criteria should be governed by the reasonable
relationship test adopted by the state governments, like that in
California, Colorado, and Ohio. Application of such a reasonable
relationship test addresses the Court’s concerns that land-use
exactions do not go “too far,” that local governments do not make
S. COMM. ON LOCAL GOV’T & S. SELECT COMM. ON PLANNING FOR CALIFORNIA’S
GROWTH, “DEVELOPER FEES: REARRANGING WHO PAYS FOR WHAT”: A BACKGROUND
STAFF REPORT FOR THE JOINT HEARING, 1 (1986); see Shapell Indus., 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 827 (describing the Act as establishing the following policies: “While it is
‘only fair’ that the public at large should not be obliged to pay for the increased
burden on public facilities caused by new development, the converse is equally
reasonable: the developer must not be required to shoulder the entire burden of
financing public facilities for all future users. ‘[T]o impose the burden on one
property owner to an extent beyond his [or her] own use shifts the government’s
burden unfairly to a private party . . . .’ It follows that facilities fees are justified
only to the extent that they are limited to the cost of increased services made
necessary by virtue of the development.” (citation omitted)).
241. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594–
96 (2013).
242. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 929 (2016)
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of cert.).
243. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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“extortionate demands” on property owners, and
development projects pay for the external costs they create.
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